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DRAFT 2/1/10
TO BE OR NOT TO BE?
CITIZENS UNITED AND THE CORPORATE FORM
Reuven S. AviYonah1
In Citizens United vs. FEC, the Supreme Court struck down a Federal ban on direct
corporate expenditures on political campaigns.2 The decision has been widely
criticized and praised as a matter of First Amendment law.3 But it is also interesting
as another step in the evolution of our legal views of the corporation.4 The thesis of
this Article is that by viewing Citizens United through the prism of theories about the
corporate form, it is possible to understand why both the majority and the dissent
departed from previous Supreme Court cases on the First Amendment rights of
corporations, and to predict what arguments can be expected next.
Historically, the corporation evolved from its origins in Roman law in a series of four
major transformations. First, the concept of the corporation as a separate legal person
from its owners or members had to be developed, and this development was only
completed with the work of the civil law Commentators in the fourteenth century. By the
end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation, i.e., a corporation with several
members who chose others to succeed them, had legal personality (the capacity to own
property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal responsibility) and unlimited life, was
well established in both civil and common law jurisdictions. The next important step was
the shift from non-profit membership corporations to for-profit business corporations,
which took place in England and the U.S. in the end of the eighteenth and beginning of
the nineteenth century. The third transformation was the shift from closely-held
corporations to corporations whose shares are widely held and publicly traded, and with it
the rise of limited liability and freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Finally, the last major
transformation was from corporations doing business in one country to multinational
enterprises whose operations span the globe, which began after World War II and is still
going on today.
Each of these four transformations was accompanied by changes in the legal conception
of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is that throughout all these changes
spanning two millennia, the same three theories of the corporation can be discerned.
Those theories are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of
its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a
1
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creature of the State; and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the
sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its
managers.5
In this Article, I will first discuss how the three theories of the corporation are reflected in
our historical jurisprudence, and then attempt to show how Citizens United fits within this
tradition. Part I discusses the cyclical evolution of the three corporate theories from the
18th century onward and shows that each transformation brought forth all three theories,
but that the real entity view always won and was the established view during periods of
stability. Part II applies this analysis to Citizens United and its antecedents Bellotti and
Austin and shows that all three theories arise in Bellotti and Austin, but that both the
majority and the dissent in Citizens United adopt the real entity view. Part III concludes
by predicting that the next confrontation will be about distinguishing between domestic
and foreign corporations for First Amendment purposes, that all three theories will be
advanced, and that ultimately the real entity view will prevail in this context as well.
I.

The Cyclical Evolution of Corporate Theories6

a. From Nonprofit to For-Profit Corporations.

By the time the American colonies declared themselves to be “free and independent
states,” the corporation was well established in English law as a membership corporation,
i.e., a corporation made up of members who selected their own successors, like the
President and Fellows of Harvard College still do today. As such, a corporation had legal
personality, i.e., the rights to own property, sue and be sued, act under a common seal,
and other such “chestnuts.”7 Private corporations were used primarily for non-profit
purposes (e.g., hospitals and universities), but by the 18th century there were also some
commercial ones (e.g., the East India Company).8
There were two important limitations on corporations in this period. The first was royal
control over corporations; in England and other European countries corporations could
only be established by royal charter. Blackstone notes that although in Roman law
corporations could be established without “the prince’s consent”, “with us in England, the
king’s consent is absolutely necessary.”9 Second, some degree of outside control over
management was established through the institution of the committee of visitors, which
represented the interests of the founder and of the wider community.10
5

These three theories are the standard ones in the literature. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201.
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Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (1989). For a discussion how these basic features of corporate legal
personality were established see Cyclical Transformations, supra.
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See the classification and description of various corporations in William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries,
chap. XVIII (1765).
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charter enumerating corporate legal rights, see, e.g., Sutton’s Hospital Case, 10 Co. Rep. 1 (1612).
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But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the corporation prevailed
throughout this period and management (the members) were firmly in control. “A
corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and
consideration of the law.”11 As such, it was a self-perpetuating body subject to relatively
little outside regulation. Corporations, Blackstone notes, are “artificial persons, who may
maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.”12 When the
members “are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are
then considered as one person in law: as one person, they have one will, which is
collected from the sense of the majority of the individuals… for all the individual
members that have existed from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever
hereafter exist, are but one person in law, a person that never dies.”13 This one person
then acquires all the rights of corporations, including perpetual succession, the right to
sue and be sued, the right to own property, to have a common seal, to make by-laws, and
to be subject to certain criminal liabilities.14 The king constituted corporations, and the
king or other visitors exercised some degree of supervision over them, but once
established, the corporation (i.e., its members) remained subject to relatively little outside
regulation.
This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable, especially since the
members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate debts.15 But the English Kings were
very cautious with granting corporate charters, especially in the case of for-profit
enterprises; only corporations that were clearly vested with a public purpose and
benefited the public fisc, like the East India and Hudson Bay Companies, received royal
approval, and accumulated vast power. As more capital was required for commercial
enterprises this resulted in promoters organizing corporations with transferable shares and
claiming that under authority of a lost or obsolete charter the shareholders enjoyed
limited liability. After the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, this problem (and the desire of
the East India Company to retain its monopoly) led to the Bubble Act, under which it
became a crime to organize such corporations without explicit royal consent.16 Although
prosecutions under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant that the entire Industrial
Revolution in England (1760-1820) took place outside the corporate form and without
limited liability.17 The Bubble Act was ultimately repealed in 1825, after the Industrial
Revolution was over, but with the provision of unlimited liability for shareholders, which
continued to be the rule in England until 1855.18
11

Sutton’s Hospital Case, 10 Co. Rep. 1, 973 (1612).
Blackstone, 455.
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Blackstone, 456.
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Blackstone, 463.
15
Although this was not clear in the Roman sources, it was well established by Blackstone’s time for
royally chartered corporations. “The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguished by
its dissolution, so that the members cannot recover, or be charged with them, in their natural capacities.”
Blackstone, 472 (citing Ulpian).
16
The Bubble Act, 6 Geo. I c. 18 (1720). See Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Enterpreneurship
and Business Organization, 1720-1844 (2000).
17
For attempts to avoid the Bubble Act which led to prosecutions see King v. Dodd, 9 East 516 (1808) and
King v. Webb, 14 East 406 (1811). See Harris, supra.
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This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state control over corporations
through restrictions on charters, meant that the next great shift in the use of corporate
form took place in the fledgling United States. There, once the revolution was over, every
state could issue corporate charters. The result was an explosion of charters for
commercial enterprises. One of the first treatises written on corporate law was Joseph
Angell and Samuel Ames’ Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate,
published in Boston in 1832.19 Angell and Ames begin their book by stating thatThe reader does not require to be told, that we have in our country an infinite
number of corporations aggregate, which have no concern whatever with affairs
of a municipal nature. These associations we not only find scattered throughout
every cultivated part of the United States, but so engaged are they in all the
varieties of useful pursuit, that we see them directing the concentration of mind
and capital to…the encouragement and extension of the great interests of
commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing. There is a great difference in this
respect between our own country, and the country from which we have derived a
great portion of our laws. What is done in England by combination, unless it be
the management of municipal concerns, is most generally done by a combination
of individuals, established by mere articles of agreement. On the other hand, what
is done here by the co-operation of several persons is, in the greater number of
instances, the result of a consolidation effected by an express act or charter of
incorporation.20
The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United States was the second
great transformation in the role of the corporation in society: from primarily a non-forprofit to primarily a for-profit enterprise. As Judge Kent stated, “the multiplication of
corporations in the United States, and the avidity with which they are sought, have arisen
in consequence of the power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over
business of every kind; and the facility which the incorporation gives to the management
of capital, and the security which it affords to the persons of its members, and to their
property not vested in the corporate stock.”21
This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival of the centuries- old
debate about the nature of the corporate form and its relationship to the shareholders and
to the state. This debate can be seen if we examine the opinions on the subject issued by
the first great American jurist, John Marshall. Three of Marshall’s opinions, written
decades apart, are particularly relevant here: Bank of the United States v. Deveaux (1809),
19

Angell and Ames were preceded by the English work of John Kyd, published in London in 1793, but that
treatise was devoted primarily to municipal corporations. See Angell & Ames, vi. The Angell & Ames
treatise was very successful, with 11 editions published until 1875.
20
Angell & Ames, v; see also ibid, 35: “In no country have corporations been multiplied to so great an
extent, as in our own…There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our community, who is
not a member of, at least, one private company or society which is incorporated…Acts of incorporation are
moreover continually solicited at every session of the legislature.”
21
Angell & Ames, 36, citing 2 Kent’s Com. 219. The last sentence refers to limited liability, which will be
discussed below.
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Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), and Bank of the United States v. Dandridge
(1827).22 These opinions represent the evolution of his thinking on corporations, which
moved from the aggregate view (Deveaux) to the artificial entity view (Dartmouth
College) to the real entity view (Dandridge).
Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the Savannah branch of the
Bank of the United States, a corporation established by Congress in 1791, as part of the
early struggles around federalism. The Bank was a membership corporation (“The
President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States”) and all the members
were citizens of Pennsylvania. The Bank refused to pay the tax and the State sent its
collectors to enforce payment, whereupon the Bank sued the collectors in federal court,
claiming diversity jurisdiction. The issue facing the court was whether a corporation
made up of members from one state could sue citizens of another state in federal court on
diversity grounds. This in turn required deciding between the view that “the individual
character of the members is so wholly lost in that of the corporation, that the court cannot
take notice of it”, and the contrary view that “a corporation is composed of natural
persons”, i.e., between the entity (artificial or real) and aggregate views.23
Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the corporation itself,
“that mere legal entity”, cannot be a citizen or sue in federal court, unless it can be
regarded as “a company of individuals”.24 However, since the reasons that led Congress
to enact diversity jurisdiction applied to corporations as well, Marshall was inclined to
see the controversy as being between the members “suing in their corporate character”
and their opponents.25 “The controversy is substantially between aliens, suing by a
corporate name, and a citizen…in this case the corporate name represents persons who
are members of the corporation.”26 The Court therefore held that federal jurisdiction
existed.
Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue involving corporations. In
the famous Dartmouth College case, the state of New Hampshire attempted to alter the
charter of Dartmouth College (incorporated as a membership corporation by George III in
1769, under the name of The Trustees of Dartmouth College), by transferring the
appointment of trustees to the state, thereby effectively taking it over. The trustees
objected, arguing that the charter constituted a contract and altering it violated the
contracts clause of the Constitution.27
Marshall held that as the College was a private corporation, its charter was a contract and
was protected by the contracts clause. He began by noting that the funds for the College
came from private sources and its educational character did not make it public either. He

22

9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809); 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827).
Deveaux, 9 U.S. 63-64.
24
9 U.S. 86-87.
25
Ibid., 87-88.
26
Ibid., 91.
27
The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
23
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then got to the heart of the question- whether the act of incorporation by the state makes
it possible for the state to take it over. In frequently quoted language, Marshall held thatA corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence.28
This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation. But Marshall then went
on to note that, having created the corporation, the state may not treat it as a mere
extension of itself: “this being does not share in the civil government of the country,
unless that be the purpose for which it was created.”29 Even though its object is to
promote governmentally approved aims, this does not make corporations into mere
instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists to represent the interest of the
founder and his descendants in the aims for which it was founded. This interest is in the
United States protected by the contracts clause, although in England, Marshall
recognized, Parliament had the power to annul the charter.30 In this country “the body
corporate, as possessing the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely
representing the donors, for the purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are
protected by the constitution.”31
It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not take over a private
corporation, even one founded for public ends, the emphasis on the artificial nature of the
corporation left ample room for state regulation via the original charter. Since states were
busy granting charters by the hundreds, the Dartmouth opinion thus enabled the states to
regulate corporations, should they wish to do so.
Finally, six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on the nature of
corporations in another case involving the Bank of the United States.32 The case involved
a suit by the Bank on a bond executed by Dandridge, one of its cashiers, in which the
defendant argued that the bond had never been approved by the Board of Directors, as
required by the charter of incorporation. The key issue was whether the level of evidence
required of corporations was higher than that required of individuals, since corporations
are incapable of acting not in writing. Justice Story for the Court held that no distinction
should be made: “The same presumptions are…applicable to corporations.”33 Marshall,
however, dissented. He argued that—
The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct from the individuals
who compose it, must be endowed with a mode of action peculiar to itself, which
will always distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This faculty
28

17 U.S. 636.
Ibid.
30
17 U.S. 642-643.
31
17 U.S. 654.
32
Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1825).
33
25 U.S. 70.
29
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must be exercised according to its own nature…This can be done only in
writing.34
The Court’s view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall’s view was more consistent
with the real entity view of the corporation as distinct from its members, individually or
collectively. It certainly forms an interesting contrast with the views he expressed in the
Deveaux case sixteen years earlier.
How can one explain the shift in Marshall’s view of the corporation from aggregate
(Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College) to real (Dandridge)? In part, this stems from
the circumstances of these particular cases. In Deveaux, Marshall wanted to confer
diversity jurisdiction to protect a federal institution (he was after all a Federalist), and the
only way to do so was to look through the corporation to its members. In Dartmouth
College, the issue involved the relationship of private corporations (albeit “imbued with a
public purpose”; the full fledged private/public distinction had not yet evolved) to the
state, and thus Marshall emphasized the role of the state in creating the corporation, while
placing clear limits on its ability to regulate corporations thereafter. These limits were
required as the result of the proliferation of corporations, especially for- profit business
corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over purely private
businesses. The result in Dartmouth College favored in practice the real entity view,
since once a private corporation was created, it could no longer be taken over or perhaps
even be overly regulated by the state. Thus, it may not be surprising that by the time he
came to write his Dandridge dissent Marshall took the real entity view, even though it
contradicted his opinion in Deveaux (which is not mentioned).
Two important legal developments during the same period strengthened the real entity
view and weakened the aggregate and artificial entity views of the corporation: the rise of
limited liability and the spread of general incorporation laws. Limited liability weakened
the aggregate view, and general incorporation weakened the artificial entity view.
First, limited liability: As we have seen, in England limited liability did not exist for
corporations until 1855. In the United States, however, most states adopted limited
liability in the 1830s.35 In their second edition, Angell & Ames explain that this was the
primary distinction between a partnership and a corporation:
In every private unincorporated company, the members are liable for the debts
without limitation, whereas in incorporated societies, they are only liable to the
extent of their shares…It is frequently the principal object, in this and in other
countries, in procuring an act of incorporation, to limit the risk of the partners to
their shares in the stock of the association; and prudent men are always backward

34
35

25 U.S. 91-92.
Phillip I. Bloomberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law (1993).
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in taking stock when they become mere copartners as regards their personal
liability for the company debts.36
When Angell & Ames wrote this limited liability was by no means a universally
established rule for corporations37; they were thus trying to establish the law as much as
describing the law that existed. Their main argument, familiar from current debates on
limited liability38, was that “[t]he public, therefore, gain by acts incorporating trading
associations, as by such means persons are induced to hazard a certain amount of
property for the purposes of trade and public improvement, who would abstain from
doing so, were not their liability limited.”39
Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most of the states established limited
liability.40 Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate
theory, because the aggregate view of corporations tends to reduce the distinction
between the corporation and its members or shareholders that is at the heart of limited
liability.41
The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases from the period 18391844, in which the Supreme Court repudiated Marshall’s opinion in Deveaux. In Bank of
Augusta v. Earle the Court held that a corporation incorporated by Georgia may execute a
valid contract in Alabama on comity grounds, but it rejected the argument that Alabama
was required to accept the contract on the basis of the privileges and immunities clause
applied directly to the corporation’s members (as required by the aggregate view), stating
that Deveaux has never been extended that far. Chief Justice Taney emphasized that he

36

Angell & Ames, 23; see also id., at 349: “No rule of law we believe is better settled, than that, in general,
the individual members of a private corporate body are not liable for the debts.” See also the cite from
Judge Kent, supra, emphasizing limited liability as a reason to incorporate.
37
Bloomberg, supra.
38
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L J. 1879 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited
Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 Yale J. on Reg. 387 (1992); Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, Do the Capital Markets Compel Limited Liability? A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102
Yale J. on Reg. 427 (1992); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1203 (2002).
39
Angell & Ames, 24. They go on to argue that states who pursue the contrary policy, like Massachusetts,
“drive millions of capital into the neighboring states for investment”- an early instance of a “race” (to the
top or bottom). Ibid., 362.
40
This was subject to one limitation, the “trust fund” doctrine, which held that the capital stock of
corporation was to be held in trust for paying corporate debts and thus could not be distributed to
shareholders while debts were outstanding. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (Cir. Ct. D. Maine,
1824).
41
See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
Yale L.J. 387, 393 (2000) (describing the “core defining characteristic of a legal entity” as the “partitioning
off of a separate set of assets in which the creditors of the firm have a prior security interest”); Margaret
M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth
Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387 (2003) (arguing that the main purpose of incorporation in the 19th century
was to “lock in” capital in the firm because shareholders cannot force distributions, in exchange for limited
liability).
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rejected the aggregate view because of its implications for limited liability, as well as its
implications for state regulation of the corporations operating in it:
The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make the corporation a mere
partnership in business, in which each stockholder would be liable to the whole
extent of his property for the debts of the corporation…Besides, it would deprive
every state of all control over the extent of corporate franchises proper to be
granted in the state.42
In Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, decided in 1844, the
Court explicitly limited Deveaux to its facts, holding that diversity jurisdiction may arise
even when some of the members of a defendant corporation are citizens of the same state
as the plaintiff.43 The Court stated that the Deveaux results “have never been satisfactory
to the bar” and that a corporation “seems to us to be a person, although an artificial one,
inhabiting and belonging to that state [of incorporation], and therefore entitled, for
purposes of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state.”44
This result was required by the proliferation of business corporations having many
shareholders in many states, as opposed to the membership corporations of Marshall’s
early days. As Angell & Ames stated, by 1832 “Joint stock companies are composed of
persons who seldom know any thing of the business of the company, but who leave the
management of it entirely to the board of directors, and are contented with receiving such
periodical dividends as the directors think proper to make.”45 The separation of
management from ownership, and the rise of limited liability, rendered the aggregate
view implausible.46
42

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586-587 (1839).
43 U.S. 497 (1844).
44
43 U.S. 376. See also Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 57 US 314 (1853), in which the Court
held that for diversity purposes a corporation should be deemed a resident of its place of incorporation.
This led to the current rule, adopted in 1958, under which a corporation is for diversity purposes a citizen of
both the state it is incorporated in and the state in which it has its principal place of business. 28 USC 1332
©.
45
Angell & Ames, 32.
46 See also Chief Justice Shaw’s statement in Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. 163 (1840), that “A
board of directors of the banks of Massachusetts is a body recognized by law. By the by‐laws of these
corporations, and by a usage, so general and uniform as to be regarded as part of the law of the land,
they have the general superintendence and active management of all the concerns of the bank, and
constitute, for purposes of dealing with others, the corporation” (emphasis added). It is hard to imagine
a clearer rejection of the aggregate view. Similarly, in Hoyt v. Thompson’s Executor, decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1859, the court held that “[i]n corporate bodies the powers of the
board of directors are, in a very important sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not
confer, nor can they revoke those powers. They are derivative only in the sense of being received
from the State in the act of incorporation. The directors convened as a board are the primary
possessors of all the powers which the charter confers, and like private principals they may delegate
to agents of their own appointment the performance of any acts which they themselves can perform.
The recognition of this principle is absolutely necessary in the affairs of every corporation whose
powers are vested in a board of directors. Without it the most ordinary business could not be carried
on, and the corporate powers could not be executed.” 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859). This constitutes a
recognition that the aggregate view deriving from the membership corporation could not be
43
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Second, general incorporation: The granting of corporate charters by state legislatures
became in the 1820s and 1830s a process fraught with corruption.47 Some Jacksonians
reacted by advocating elimination of the rights of states to grant corporate charters. But
the corporate form was so widely used that this was impracticable; instead, laws were
passed in all the states permitting anyone to form a corporation on payment of a fee,
without permission by the state legislature.48 This democratizing move meant that the
artificial entity theory, under which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost
most of its appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations.
Instead, corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state,
and the real entity view reigned supreme.49
b. From Closely-Held to Widely-Held Corporations.
The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was thus the proliferation
of for profit corporations, incorporated under general incorporation laws with minimal
interference by the state, and whose shareholders enjoyed limited liability. Those
shareholders were, however, relatively limited in number; despite the Angell & Ames
quotation above, few corporations before 1865 required massive amounts of capital, and
most were small, closely held enterprises. This enabled the Civil War income tax on
corporate income to be imposed directly on the shareholders of corporations.50
This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the railroads, followed by the
steel and oil companies. With the rise of large corporate enterprises, massive amounts of
capital were required, and between 1865 and the 1890s the widely held, publicly traded,
non-owner managed enterprise gradually became the norm for U.S. business activities.
This was followed from 1890 to 1906 by a wave of consolidation that left several
important business areas dominated by monopolies run by the “robber barons.”
The shift from small, closely held enterprises to massive, publicly held ones once again
necessitated a re-examination of the corporate form, and again all three theories of the
corporation appear. A classic example of the aggregate view is the Santa Clara case,
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in 1886. This case is famous for Chief Justice
Waite’s statement that “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the [equal protection clause] applies to these corporations. We are all of the
maintained as a practical matter in corporations with hundreds or thousands of shareholders, as
already existed in the 1850s.
47
See Angell & Ames, 35-36.
48
See, e.g., the act adopted in 1837 by Connecticut permitting incorporation of “any lawful business”, ch.
63, 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49, and various cases upholding such laws, e.g., Nesmith v. Sheldon, 48 US 812
(1849). See also President Jackson’s veto message of the second bank of the United States, cited in Davis,
611: “If [the government] would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its
favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing.”
49
The same result was obtained in England by the adoption of the Regulation and Incorporation Act, 19 &
20 Vict. C. 47 (1856).
50
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 1193 (2004).
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opinion that it does.”51 Some scholars identified this as an application of the real entity
view to corporations, but Prof. Horwitz has shown by examining Justice Field’s opinion
in the court below that it actually represented an application of the aggregate view.
Specifically, Field held that the equal protection clause must apply to corporations for the
following reasons:
Private corporations consist of an association of individuals united for some
lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their business and have
succession of membership without dissolution…But these members do not,
because of such association, lose their right to protection, and equality of
protection…Whatever affects the property of the corporation- that is, of all the
members united by the common name- necessarily affects their interests…So,
therefore, whenever a provision of the constitution or of a law guarantees to
persons protection in their property… the benefits of the provision are extended to
corporations; not to the name under which different persons are united, but to the
individuals composing the union. The courts will always look through the name to
see and protect those whom the name represents [citing Deveaux.]52
A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined; most remarkable is
Field’s reliance on Deveaux despite the fact that the Supreme Court overturned its results
forty years earlier. Similarly, in Pembina Consolidated Co. v. Pennsylvania, decided two
years later, Justice Field for the Court stated that “Under the designation of person there
is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely
associations of individuals united for a special purpose.”53
However, the artificial entity view was also raised in these cases. In Santa Clara, the
railroad corporations made the argument that because they were operating under special
congressional legislation they should be regarded as an extension of the federal
government and therefore California could not tax them.54 Field rejected this view (citing
Dartmouth College), but noted that “when the instrumentality is the creation of the statea corporation formed under its laws-and is employed or adopted by the general
government for its convenience…it remains subject to the taxing power of the state.”55
And notably, in Pembina Field followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the
privileges and immunities clause applied to corporations because they were not
“citizens”, even though the aggregate view he adopted in Santa Clara might have led to
the contrary position. Instead, Field emphasized the relationship between the corporation
and the incorporating state under the artificial entity view:

51

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa
Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173 (1985).
52
18 F. 385 (C.D.D. Cal. 1883), 409-410.
53
125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888). See also Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50 (1890), in which the
Court stated that “we do not see that the right of the parties in regard to the assets of this corporation differ
from those of a partnership on its dissolution.”
54
18 F. Rep. 387.
55
18 F. Rep. 389.
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The term citizens, as used in this clause, applies only to natural persons, members
of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created
by the legislature, and possessing only such attributes as the legislature has
prescribed…a grant of corporate existence was a grant of special privileges to the
corporators, enabling them to act for certain specified purposes as a single
individual, and exempting them, unless otherwise provided, from individual
liability.56
Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in Hale v. Henkel, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1906. The issues were whether an agent of a corporation could invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure in the name of the corporation. On the
Fifth Amendment issue, the Court held that the right against self-incrimination does not
apply to corporations:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself
is purely a personal privilege of the witness…The question whether a corporation
is a “person” within the meaning of this Amendment really does not arise…since
it can only be heard by oral evidence in the person of some one of its agents or
employees.57
This is closest to the real entity view, since it rejects (like Marshall in Dandridge) the
aggregate position of looking through a corporation to its shareholders, and takes into
account the special characteristics of the corporation itself.
On the other hand, on the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court at first emphasized the
artificial entity view, using it to justify regulation by the state:
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under
investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the corporation
with respect to the production of its books and papers, we are of the opinion
that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a
corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and
papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may stand
upon his constitutional rights as a citizen…Upon the other hand, the
corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for
the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises,
and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its
charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized
by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so
long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded
its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having
56
57

125 US 187-88.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
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chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in the
exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed,
and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of the
corporate books and papers for that purpose…While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an
immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special
privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an
abuse of such privileges.58
However, having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of the
constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverts to the aggregate view when facing
the question whether corporations have any Fourth Amendment rights at all:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not
entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is
protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against unlawful
discrimination. Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business
activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all
great enterprises.59
What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three views? The key is
the last sentence quoted. As noted above, the period between 1890 and 1906
marked the height of the debate on the rise of the great corporations. The Court is
trying to strike a balance between the rights of the corporations, which can best be
protected under either the aggregate or the real entity views, and the regulatory
power of the state, which is best reflected in the artificial entity view. On the one
hand, as the Court states, “[c]orporations are a necessary feature of modern
business activity” and must be protected. On the other hand, the right of the state to
regulate must also be preserved, especially since the context of Hale v. Henkel was
58

201 US 74-75. Remarkably, the court applies this analysis to give powers to the federal government over
state corporations: “It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the laws of New Jersey,
and that it receives its franchise from the legislature of that State; but such franchises, so far as they involve
questions of interstate commerce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of Congress to
regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also assert a sovereign
authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in a lawful manner, with a due regard to
its own laws. Being subject to this dual sovereignty, the General Government possesses the same right to
see that its own laws are respected as the State would have with respect to the special franchises vested in it
by the laws of the State. The powers of the General Government in this particular in the vindication of its
own laws, are the same as if the corporation had been created by an act of Congress. It is not intended to
intimate, however, that it has a general visitatorial power over state corporations.” Ibid, 75. This issue came
up in the corporate tax debate as well. Avi-Yonah, corporate tax, supra.
59
Ibid., 76 (cites omitted).
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an antitrust investigation into two major corporations, the American Tobacco
Company and McAndrews & Forbes Inc.
Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.60 This involved first the
rejection of the aggregate view. For example, in Western Turf Association v.
Greenberg, decided just one year after Hale v. Henkel, Justice Harlan emphasized that
a corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders, and therefore is not a
“citizen” for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause or entitled to the
protection of the due process clause: “the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural,
not artificial, persons.”61 But by itself this position would have led to too much state
regulation for the Lochner court. Thus, in Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, decided in
1909, the Court came out clearly for the position that the corporation as such was
entitled to constitutional protection under the equal protection clause, without any
reference to its shareholders: “the corporation…is within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a person within the jurisdiction of the state of Alabama,
and entitled to be protected against any statute of the State which deprives it of the
equal protection of the laws.”62
Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained by several factors.
The aggregate view was raised by Field and others to protect the rights of
corporations, but it was even more incongruous in the context of the mega‐
corporations of the 1890s, with thousands of shareholders, than in the pre‐civil
days. It also gave the corporation too many rights vis‐a‐vis the state, as seen in Hale
v. Henkel and in Greenberg. The artificial entity view gave the state too much power
to regulate corporations, as the Hale v. Henkel court came to realize when it laid out
its implications. The real entity view was the most congruent with business realities
as well as the one most suited to some balance between corporations and the state.
By 1909, it was well established as the dominant view of the corporation, as
reflected in contemporary debates surrounding the enactment of the corporate
tax.63

60

This view was also reflected in contemporary books and law review articles. See, e.g., Freund, The
Legal Nature of Corporations (1897); Deiser, The Juristic Person, 57 U. Pa. L. Rev. 131 (1908); Machen,
Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253 (1911); Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 Harv. L.
Rev. 404 (1916) ; I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Columbia L. Rev. 496
(1912) (all rejecting the aggregate view). Compare for a statement of the aggregate view Morawetz, A
Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations (1882), at iii (“the existence of the corporation as an entity
independent of its members is a fiction.”)
61
204 U.S. 359, 363.
62
216 U.S. 400, 417. Remarkably this case involves a discriminatory state tax similar to the one struck
down by Field on aggregate grounds in Santa Clara. See also similar statements in Ludwig v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 216 US 146, 157 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 US 56, 64 (1910); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 US 1, 36 (1910), which finally eliminated the restrictions imposed by Bank of
Augusta v. Earl. See Horwitz, supra.
63
See Avi-Yonah, corporate tax, supra.
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The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other contemporary
developments: the rise of the business judgment rule, and the decline of the ultra
vires doctrine.64 The business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in holding
that the board of directors held powers that were not delegated from the
shareholders and that shareholders could not normally call into question the
exercise of those powers. The ultra vires doctrine represented the ability of the state
to require corporations to adhere to their charter, and was thus based on the
artificial entity view; its decline thus reinforced the rejection of that view.
The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in Leslie v. Lorillard,
decided by the New York Court of appeals in 1888. The court held that‐
In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or trustees,
courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally or
unconscientiously executed…Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as
grounds for equity interference; for the powers entrusted with corporate
management are largely discretionary.65
A year later the same court expanded this statement, holding that‐
All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted, of necessity,
must be exercised by the directors who are constituted by the law as the
agency for the doing of corporate acts. The expression of the corporate will
and the performance of corporate functions in the management of a
corporation, may originate with its directors…Within the chartered authority
they have the fullest power to regulate the concerns of a corporation,
according to their best judgment…In the management of the affairs of the
corporation, they are dependent solely upon their own knowledge of its
business and their own judgment as to what its interests require.66

64

Another related development was the strengthening of limited liability resulting from the demise of the
“trust fund” doctrine, which held that the capital stock of a corporation must be held in trust for the benefit
of its creditors. This doctrine, which originated from Justice Story’s opinion in Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed.
Cas. 435 (1824), was upheld by the Supreme Court in Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610 (1873) on the basis on
the aggregate view (“after all this artificial body is but the representative of its stockholders, and exists
mainly for their benefit, and is governed and controlled by them through the officers whom they elect”, 84
U.S. 623). See also W. W. Cook, Stock & Stockholders (1887), 322. However, in 1892 the Supreme Court
of Minnesota held in Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, that “this trust fund
doctrine…is not sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute a safe foundation upon which to build a
system of legal rules…corporate property is not held in trust…Absolute control and power of disposition
are inconsistent with the idea of trust. The capital of a corporation is its property…a corporation is in law as
distinct a person as an individual is, and is entitled to hold property (if not contrary to its charter) as
absolutely as an individual can hold it.” The doctrine then fell into desuetude, reinforced by the invention
of no par stock in the early 20th century. See Horwitz, supra.
65
110 N.Y. 519, 532 (1888).
66
Beveridge v. New York Elevated Railroad Co., 111 N.Y. 1 (1889).
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This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could write that “it is [the
board’s] judgment, and not that of its stockholders outside of the board of directors,
that is to shape [a corporation’s] policies or decide upon its corporate acts. This
principle is not disputed, and the citation of authorities in its support is
unnecessary.”67 The rule reflected the real entity view, which equates the
corporation with its management, and rejected the aggregate view of the
corporation as an aggregate of its shareholders.68
The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the ultra vires doctrine,
which held that a board could not act contrary to the powers conferred on it by the
state. The ultra vires doctrine thus represented the artificial entity view. The
doctrine originated in the pre‐ civil war era,69 but became prominent in the
arguments on the relationship of the state and the corporation in the 1880s and
1890s.70 The artificial entity argument for upholding the limitation was stated
clearly by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888‐
In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have had in view
the public interest; and public policy is (as the interests of stockholders
ought to be) concerned in the restriction of corporations within chartered
limits, and a departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot
result in prejudice to the public or to the shareholders. As artificial creations,
they have no powers or faculties, except those with which they were
endowed when created…Corporations are great engines for the promotion of
the public convenience, and for the development of public wealth, and, so
long as they are conducted for the purposes for which organized, they are a
public benefit; but if allowed to engage, without supervision, in subjects of
enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control
and monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are engaged, they
become a public menace, against which public policy and statutes design
protection.71
The doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court in the following year. Referring to
the artificial entity doctrine, the Court stated that ‐‐
It may be considered as the established doctrine of this court in regard to the
powers of corporations, that they are such and such only as are conferred
upon them by the acts of the legislatures of the several States under which
67

Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 140 F. 117, 118 (D.D.C.N.J. 1905). See also Manson v. Curtis, 223
N.Y. 313, 323 (1918), in which the court held that “[d]irectors are the exclusive, executive representatives
of the corporation and are charged with the administration of its internal affairs and the management and
use of its assets. Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors.”
68
It also represented a transition from an agency to a trustee model of the relationship between
shareholders and management. See Millon, supra.
69
See, e.g., Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (NY Sup. Ct. 1861).
70
See, e.g., the extensive discussion in W.W. Cook’s treatise, ch. 19 and 38 (1887).
71
Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 531-533 (1888).
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they are organized. A corporation in this country, whatever it may have been
in England at a time when the crown exercised the right of creating such
bodies, can only have an existence under the express law of the State or
sovereignty by which it is created. And these powers, where they do not
relate to municipal corporations exercising authority conferred solely for the
benefit of the public, and in some sense parts of the body politic of the State,
have in this country until within recent years always been conferred by
special acts of the legislative body under which they claim to exist. But the
rapid growth of corporations, which have come to take a part in all or nearly
all of the business operations of the country, and especially in enterprises
requiring large aggregations of capital and individual energy, as well as their
success in meeting the needs of a vast number of most important commercial
relations, have demanded the serious attention and consideration of law
makers. And while valuable services have been rendered to the public by
this class of organizations, which have stimulated their formation by
numerous special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended
by many evils in their operation as well as much good, and that the hasty
manner in which they were created by the legislatures, sometimes with
exclusive privileges, often without due consideration and under the influence
of improper motives, frequently led to bad results.72
The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and indeed the ultra
vires doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts under New York and Ohio
law.73 However, in 1895 the Supreme Court rejected an antitrust challenge to the
sugar trust on the grounds that the Sherman Act applied only to corporations
engaged directly in interstate commerce.74 And in 1896 the Court rejected an ultra
vires challenge to the ability of the Union Pacific Railway to lease its tracks for 999
years to another railroad, when the charter would not permit an outright sale.75 This
literal decision significantly reduced the power of the ultra vires doctrine.76
The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court decision but from the
competition among states to attract corporate charters, which was begun by New
Jersey in 1890 and continued by Delaware in the 1900s.77 This competition meant
72

Oregon Railway & Navigation Co. v. The Oregonian Railway Co. Ltd., 130 U.S. 1 (1889).
See People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 282 (1890); State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio
St. 137 (1892). See also Theodore Dwight, The Legality of Trusts, 3 Poli. Sci. Q. 592 (1888); William
Cook, The Corporation Problem (1891).
74
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
75
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co., 163 U.S. 564 (1896).
76
See W. Cook, Treatise on Stock and Stockholders, 971-73 (3rd ed. 1894): “The courts are becoming more
liberal, and many acts which fifty years ago would have been held to be ultra vires would now be held to be
intra vires.” By 1898 Cook wrote that “the doctrine of ultra vires is disappearing.” Cook, Treatise on the
Law of Corporations vii (4th ed. 1898). On this entire development see Horwitz.
77
See Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 198 (1899); Lincoln
Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, 25 McLure’s Magazine 41 (1905); Russel Larcom, The Delaware
Corporation (1937), ch. 1. On the “race to the bottom/race to the top” debate see generally William Cary,
73
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that New Jersey and Delaware had every incentive to relax any limiting elements in
their charters that restricted the power of corporate management.78 Thus, for
example, the long‐lasting prohibition against corporations owning stock in other
corporations, which led to the necessity of “trusts”, was eliminated by New Jersey in
its 1890 law.79 As a result, although the Supreme Court still held in 1899 that such a
combination was ultra vires under New York law, this holding became rather
meaningless since most large, publicly traded corporations were incorporated in
New Jersey.80 As the New Jersey statute explains:
It was formerly the rule in this State that acts of a corporation in excess of its
express powers, or those necessarily implied, were void, and contracts which
were ultra vires the corporation were incapable of enforcement or
ratification…This rule no longer obtains.81
The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of corporate laws
permitting incorporation “for any lawful purpose”. With the doctrine gone, the
artificial entity view of the corporation became less plausible, and the real entity
view reigned supreme again.82
c. The Hostile Takeover Crisis.
In 1926 John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he dismissed
as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real entity views of the
corporation. These views, he explained, could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he
used examples relying on the cyclical nature if these theories. His conclusion was that
theory should be abandoned for an examination of reality.83
Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate personality largely
disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter, however, the real entity view
predominated for large, publicly traded corporations. The board ran the corporation as it
saw fit, protected from the shareholders by the separation of ownership from
management noted by Berle & Means in the 1930s, and by the business judgment rule,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, State
Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal S. 251 (1977); Lucian Benchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. 1435 (1992); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value, 62 J. Fin. Econ. 525
(2001).
78
See James Dill, Trusts-Their Uses and Abuses (1901); “New Jersey Legislating for the United States”,
Indianapolis Journal (Nov. 11, 1901);
79
General Corporation Act of New Jersey (1890 rev.), sec. 51. See also sec. 104 (authorizing mergers);
W.W. Cook, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations (4th ed., 1898), vi.
80
De La Vergne Refrigerating Machine Co. v. German Savings Institution, 175 U.S. 40 (1899).
81
General Corporation Law of New Jersey, 10 (1896).
82
See Machen, supra. Another significant development in this period was states passing statutes that
allowed a majority of shareholders to sell corporate assets (before the 1890s, shareholder unanimity was
required). This greatly facilitated mergers and also represented the decline of the aggregate view. See
Horwitz, supra.
83
John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655 (1926).
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and protected from the state by the relaxation of corporate law limits begun by New
Jersey and continued by Delaware.84
The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only arose in the 1980s. As a
result of the invention of the junk bond market, it suddenly became possible for hostile
raiders to threaten takeovers of even the largest corporations. After RJR Nabisco was
taken private for $25 billion in 1988, it was clear that no board was safe. As a result,
debates on the nature of the corporation and its relationship to the shareholders and the
state, which began in the academic literature in the 1970s, once again became a matter of
practical concern. And once again all three theories of the corporation reappeared, as can
be seen if one examines three seminal cases decided between 1982 and 1989 by the
Supreme Courts of the United States and of Delaware.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, involved the
constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state of Illinois.85 Under the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile tender offer for the shares of a company
covered by the act had to be registered by the Secretary of State and the offeror had to
give both the target and the state a 20 day notice during which only the target could
communicate with its shareholders regarding the offer. The act applied both to
corporations 10% of whose shareholders were resident of Illinois and to corporations that
were either incorporated in the state or had their principal office in it. The MITE
corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois corporation and refused to comply with
the act, arguing that it violated the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice White held
that the Illinois act was unconstitutional because it could apply to tender offers that did
not affect a single Illinois shareholder; “the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
nonresident shareholders.”86 Moreover, the fact that the target corporation was an Illinois
corporation was irrelevant since state regulation only applied to the corporation’s
“internal affairs”: “Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third
party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.”87
Instead, the focus should be entirely on the impact of blocking the tender offer on the
company’s shareholders and their relationship with management:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide
tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to
sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to
84

This state of affairs prompted Adolph Berle, the prime intellect behind the shareholder primacy doctrine
in the 1930s, to concede defeat in 1956. See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern
University, in Richard Ellis, Corporation Giving in a Free Society 29 (1956): “Twenty years ago, the writer
had a controversy with the late Professor E. Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that
corporate powers were powers in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these powers
were held in trust for the entire community. The argument has been settled, at least for the time being,
squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”
85
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
86
457 U.S. 644.
87
457 U.S. 645.
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their highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and
competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides
incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain high is
reduced. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1173‐
1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for
Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Texas L. Rev.
1, 5, 27‐28, 45 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94‐1373, p. 12 (1976).
This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view: The focus is entirely on
the impact on the corporation’s shareholders, and the corporation itself (including
its management) barely exist, as indicated by the statement that a change in
corporate control has no relevance to the internal affairs of the corporation. The
market for corporate control is praised because of its ability to overcome the agency
cost problem and the incentive it provides for management to maximize stock
prices. Moreover, White quotes the work of Easterbrook and Fischel, who are among
the principal proponents of the “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation,
according to which the corporation is merely a convenient legal term for a series of
contracts, the most important of which is the contract between shareholders and
management.88
This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and the real entity
theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice Powell, even though he
joined it to provide the crucial fifth vote. Powell noted that in some cases the state
may have a legitimate interest because the corporation has a real presence that goes
beyond a contract between management and the shareholders, reflecting both the
artificial and real entity views:
I join Part V‐B because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for
state regulation of tender offers. This period in our history is marked by
conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust
laws. Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of professional
personnel experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, that vastly exceed
those of the takeover target. This disparity in resources may seriously
disadvantage a relatively small or regional target corporation. Inevitably
there are certain adverse consequences in terms of general public interest
when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and State.*
* The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational
corporations tend to be located in the large cities of a few States. When
88

See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra. Fischel stated that “[a] corporation…is nothing more than a legal
fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered into
for their mutual benefit.” The point that the nexus of contracts theory is a reinvention of the aggregate view
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corporate headquarters are transferred out of a city and State into one of
these metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which the transfer is
made inevitably suffer significantly. Management personnel ‐‐ many of
whom have provided community leadership ‐‐ may move to the new
corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and
educational life ‐‐ both in terms of leadership and financial support ‐‐ also
tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.
Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these misgivings into an
opinion for the Court that emphasized instead the artificial entity view of the
corporation. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Co. involved a so‐called “second generation” anti‐
takeover statute, i.e., one that was drafted to get around the problems with the
Illinois statute struck down in MITE.89 The Indiana statute applied only to
corporations incorporated in Indiana, which have specified level of shareholders
within the state, and which opt for its protection. Under the statute, an acquirer who
acquired “control shares” in such an Indiana target could vote them only with the
approval of a majority of the pre‐existing disinterested shareholders, to be obtained
in a meeting within 50 days after the acquisition.
The Court of Appeals followed MITE and declared the statute unconstitutional under
the commerce clause, because it interfered with the market for corporate control:
“Even if a corporation’s tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which
they are employed and the proportions in which the earnings they generate are
divided between management and shareholders depends on the market for
corporate control‐ an interstate, indeed international, market that the State of
Indiana is not authorized to opt out of.”90
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell, writing for a 5‐4 majority, stated that‐
No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than
a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority
to define the voting rights of shareholders…We think the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact
that state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose
very existence and attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice
Marshall explained: “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such
as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created."
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819).91
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Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to regulate transactions
affecting shareholders, including shareholders in other states. He argued that the “free
market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation…is organized under,
and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction…A State has an interest in promoting
stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters.”92 And he
explicitly rejected the market for corporate control and its underlying aggregate theory:
“The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic
theory…there is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may
result from repetitive takeovers will result in more effective management or otherwise be
beneficial to shareholders…the very commodity that is traded in the “market for
corporate control”- the corporation- is one that owes its existence and attributes to state
law.”93
This entire opinion, with its quotation from Dartmouth College, is clearly based on the
artificial entity view that the corporation owes its existence to the incorporating state and
that state may therefore regulate it, including in ways that affect shareholders’ ability to
sell their shares. Not surprisingly, Justice White dissented, arguing that while the statute
may help Indiana corporations “particularly in helping those corporations maintain the
status quo”, it is inimical to the interests of the shareholders and constitutes “economic
protectionism.”94
After CTS, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and the most important
state in this regard was Delaware, in which most major US corporations are incorporated.
Delaware law was favorable to hostile takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court of
Delaware issued an opinion in Paramount v. Time that in practice ended the hostile
takeover boom.95 Paramount had made a $175 (later raised to $200) per share offer for
Time at the time when Time was about to enter into a $70 per share merger with Warner.
Paramount argued that under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Unocal (1985) and Revlon (1986), Time was “up for sale” and therefore the business
judgment rule was suspended and Time’s board was required to maximize shareholder
value by accepting the much higher Paramount bid.
The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated thatTwo key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law imposes on a
board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of
action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus,
the question of "long-term" versus "short-term" values is largely irrelevant
because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation
which is in its best interest without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second,
absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of
92
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directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any
per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of
a takeover.96
The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term shareholder value was
always required; instead, the board was permitted to pursue its view of the best long-term
corporate strategy:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the
stockholders' duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary duty to
manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for
achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the
stockholders. Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
corporate plan for a short‐term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no
basis to sustain the corporate strategy.
Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the “Time culture” (its
stated goal over maximizing the cash return to shareholders). This effectively killed
the takeover threat, because any board could find good long‐term share value
maximization reasons to reject a superior cash bid. The Delaware court, in thus
enhancing managerial power, in effect endorsed the real entity view: A corporation
was an entity with its own corporate culture, which should not be subordinated to
the shareholders or to the state. This view was ratified when the ALI corporate
governance project adopted a rule that corporate boards may take into account the
interests of other “stakeholders,” not just the shareholders.97
Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that corporate
management determines the state of incorporation, and therefore the Delaware
Supreme Court felt that it had to side with management once the U.S. Supreme Court
had approved the anti‐takeover laws of other states, lest corporations choose to
relocate there. However, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason; Delaware is
very well established as the preferred state of incorporation, and stock values would
likely decrease if shareholders perceive that management were leaving Delaware
just to protect themselves. Instead, it seems likely that the Delaware Supreme Court
genuinely believed that a corporation like Time had a corporate existence and
culture with implications for other stakeholders, and therefore rejected the
aggregate view equating the corporation with its shareholders. In that way, its
concerns were similar to those raised by Justice Powell in his concurrence in MITE:
A corporation is more than a “nexus of contracts”, and courts and legislatures are
allowed to take the interests of other stakeholders into account.
d. From National Corporations to Multinational Enterprises.
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The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in the 1950s and is still
going on, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to judge. This is the transformation from
corporations based mostly in one country to multinational enterprises based in many
countries.
Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets overseas, have existed since
the 17th century. However, as recently as the 1950s, the shareholders and other sources of
capital, the management, most of the production facilities, and most of the markets of
even large multinationals tended to be in one country, so that “what was good for G.M.
was good for America.” By the 1990s, however, this has changed profoundly. As more
countries opened up to foreign direct investment, communications improved, and many
products became lighter and easier to ship, more and more corporations became
“globalized.” In a globalized multinational, the sources of capital are in many countries:
The shares of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty exchanges, and borrowing
facilities are similarly diversified. Research and development and production facilities are
likewise spread throughout the globe, as are markets. The only thing that usually ties a
modern multinational to its home country is the location of management.
In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has re-opened. There is
abundant academic writing on the relationship between multinationals and the state, and
most writers from both left and right concede that this relationship has changed
profoundly so that the home state (the state of incorporation) has become powerless to
control “its” multinationals; it is hard even to identify to which country multinationals
“belong”.98 On a practical level this situation has led to attempts by home states to control
the behavior of multinationals abroad in areas as diverse as trading with the enemy,
antitrust, corruption and others, with varying success.99 The most recent development in
this regard has been “inversion” transactions, in which the management changes the
country of incorporation of a multinational’s parent corporation. These transactions are
undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they have corporate governance implications as
well.100 Specifically, the artificial entity theory becomes hard to maintain when
management can pick weak countries like Bermuda as the country of incorporation for
the parent of a multinational.
The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as shareholders now tend
to come from many countries. One implication of this has been that the securities laws of
the weakest country tend to dominate because of cross-country price arbitrage.101 Another
98
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is academic proposals to let management choose the country of securities law as well as
the country of incorporation.102 On a practical level globalization has led the SEC to relax
requirements for some foreign issuers.103 This trend has tended to weaken the
applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard to predict where these trends will
lead, but at the moment they appear once more to favor the real entity view.
e. Conclusion
To summarize: Throughout all the transformations we have studied, the same pattern
recurs. As the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or
shareholders changes, all three views of the corporation emerge, submerge and then reemerge in a slightly different but fundamentally similar form. In the end, however, the
real entity view prevails.
Why does the real entity view prevail? In part, this is no doubt due to the fact that it
represents the most congenial view to corporate management, because it shields them
from undue interference from both shareholders and the state. Corporate management
wields political power and it influences the outcome of the debate; judges again and again
refer to the importance of corporations, by which they mean corporate management. But
the very fact that corporate management wields this power shows that there is another
reason why the real entity view prevails: It fits reality much more than the other two. In
some periods (e.g., the Roman Empire or 18th century Europe) the power of the state is
overwhelming and the artificial entity view seems plausible, and in other periods (the
medieval membership corporation, the 19th century close corporation) the aggregate view
seems plausible, but in most periods equating the corporation either with the state or with
shareholders must have seemed to most non-academics highly implausible.104 The real
102
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entity view prevailed because it was more real than the others. And this observation
enables us to move from the historical to the contemporary and ask how Citizens United
and its antecedents fit the historical pattern.

II.

Citizens United: A Real Entity Case

The Supreme Court first addressed the question whether corporations had a right to
engage in political speech under the First Amendment in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, decided in 1978.105 Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
banks and business corporations from expending funds on advertising to influence the
result of political referenda. In the context of a referendum to introduce progressive
taxation on individuals, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the law was
constitutional because the First Amendment rights of corporations are limited to issues
that “materially affect its business, property, or assets.”106
The Supreme Court reversed. The three opinions in the case reflect the three theories of
the corporation. Justice Powell for a five Justice majority adopted the real view, stating
that –
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State
could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.107
The majority thus treated corporations as equivalent to individuals, citing Santa Clara for
the proposition that corporations are persons for Fourteenth Amendment purposes and
therefore protected by the First Amendment (as applied under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the states).108 It explicitly rejected the artificial entity theory advanced by
Massachusetts (“corporations, as creatures of the State, have only those rights granted
them by the State”) because the national banks that brought the case are “creatures of
federal law…and their existence is in no way dependent on state law.”109 And the
majority also explicitly rejected the aggregate view that the intent of the statute was to

The problem of embeddedness, 91 Am J Sociology 481 (1985) This branch of economics, which now
forms part of the “new institutional economics”, begins by recognizing that the firm is fundamentally
different from the market because of its hierarchical structure, and proceeds to investigate when operating
as a firm as opposed to buying in the market makes sense (the “make or buy” issue). Transaction cost
economics has become the leading explanation for the most recent transformation of the corporation- the
rise of multinational enterprises. Pitelis and Sugden, The Nature of the Transnational Firm (1991).
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protect shareholders from management expressing different views than their own, stating
that the normal “procedures of corporate democracy” are sufficient to protect them.110
The heart of Justice Powell’s opinion lies in his concern that striking down the
Massachusetts statute would infringe on corporate activities that he views as beneficial,
but unrelated to corporate business operations: “Thus corporate activities that are widely
viewed as educational and socially constructive would be prohibited. Corporations no
longer would be able safely to support—by contributions or public service advertising—
educational, charitable, cultural, or even human rights causes.”111 And Justice Powell
rejected as unsupported by the record the view that “corporations are wealthy and
powerful and their views may drown out other points of view.”112 This also reflects the
real view because corporations are judged as standing on their own, not as reflecting the
views of shareholders or as creatures of the state. The aggregate view, as reflected in
Milton Friedman’s writings from the same period, would object to the same kind of
“corporate social responsibility” considerations as not being in the shareholders’ interest.
Justice White’s dissent, on the other hand, advances the aggregate view. He argues that –
There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within the scope of
the First Amendment. This, however, is merely the starting point of analysis,
because an examination of the First Amendment values that corporate expression
furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing
reveals that it is not fungible with communications emanating from individuals
and is subject to restrictions which individual expression is not…. Shareholders in
[for profit corporate] entities do not share a common set of political or social
views, and they certainly have not invested their money for the purpose of
advancing political or social causes or in an enterprise engaged in the business of
disseminating news and opinion. … Of course, it may be assumed that corporate
investors are united by a desire to make money, for the value of their investment
to increase. Since even communications which have no purpose other than that of
enriching the communicator have some First Amendment protection, activities
such as advertising and other communications integrally related to the operation
of the corporation's business may be viewed as a means of furthering the desires
of individual shareholders. This unanimity of purpose breaks down, however,
when corporations make expenditures or undertake activities designed to
influence the opinion or votes of the general public on political and social issues
that have no material connection with or effect upon their business, property, or
assets. Although it is arguable that corporations make such expenditures because
their managers believe that it is in the corporations' economic interest to do so,
there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of the
heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political
issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse
any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the value of a
110
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particular corporate investment. This is particularly true where, as in this case,
whatever the belief of the corporate managers may be, they have not been able to
demonstrate that the issue involved has any material connection with the
corporate business. Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a
political candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of
its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals would.113
This is clearly an aggregate view, and it is congruent with the position taken by Justice
White in MITE four years later.114 The emphasis is entirely on the shareholders, not on
the corporation itself.
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, dissented from the majority from an artificial entity
perspective. He stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment does protect
corporations, there are limits to such protection because the corporation is a creature of
the state, citing Dartmouth College:
The appellants herein either were created by the Commonwealth or were admitted
into the Commonwealth only for the limited purposes described in their charters
and regulated by state law. Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a
corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons, …
our inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are
"incidental to its very existence." Dartmouth College, supra, at 636.
There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with the power to
acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the
corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of law.
Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a
newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of
the press essential to the conduct of its business. … Although the Court has never
explicitly recognized a corporation's right of commercial speech, such a right
might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial
corporation.
It cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is equally
necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial
purposes. A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of potentially
perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity.
It might reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere. Furthermore, it
might be argued that liberties of political expression are not at all necessary to
effectuate the purposes for which States permit commercial corporations to exist.
So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and Federal Governments remain
113
114
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open to protect the corporation's interest in its property, it has no need, though it
may have the desire, to petition the political branches for similar protection.
Indeed, the States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its
economic power to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed. 6 I
would think that any particular form of organization upon which the State confers
special privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be
subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a partnership,
a trade association, or a corporation. …
I can see no basis for concluding that the liberty of a corporation to engage in
political activity with regard to matters having no material effect on its business is
necessarily incidental to the purposes for which the Commonwealth permitted
these corporations to be organized or admitted within its boundaries. Nor can I
disagree with the Supreme Judicial Court's factual finding that no such effect has
been shown by these appellants. Because the statute as construed provides at least
as much protection as the Fourteenth Amendment requires, I believe it is
constitutionally valid.115
It is hard to imagine a clearer statement of the artificial and aggregate views than the
positions taken by Justices Rehnquist and White respectively. But the majority taking the
real entity view prevailed, presumably because in1978 it was hard to view corporations as
a mere aggregation of their shareholders or as mere creatures of the state. Surprisingly,
the majority opinion was written by Justice Powell, who as we have seen took an
artificial entity view in MITE and CTS. The explanation is that the hostile takeover
movement threatened the same educational and charitable activities of corporations that
Powell sought to defend in Bellotti, so in that context he needed to empower the state to
save “its” corporations.
The emphasis on the artificial entity view in CTS may also have influenced the result in
the Court’s next First Amendment case related to corporations, Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce, decided three years after CTS.116 The issue in Austin was
whether a state could ban corporate direct expenditures in support of or in opposition to
candidates for state office, as opposed to expenditures through “Political Action
Committees” (PACs) organized for this purpose. Justice Marshall for a six Justice
majority that included Rehnquist and White held that the ban was constitutional. The
majority opinion reflects the artificial entity view held by Rehnquist:
State law grants corporations special advantages -- such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets -- that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in
ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments. These statecreated advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the
Nation's economy, but also permit them to use "resources amassed in the
115
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economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace." … the political advantage of corporations is unfair because
"[t]he resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an
indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas. They
reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and
customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a
formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may
be no reflection of the power of its ideas."
We therefore have recognized that "the compelling governmental interest in
preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence of political war
chests funneled through the corporate form." …
The Chamber argues that this concern about corporate domination of the political
process is insufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures.
Although this Court has distinguished these expenditures from direct contributions
in the context of federal laws regulating individual donors, Buckley, 424 U.S., at
47, it has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or
apparent corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to
influence candidate elections, Bellotti, supra, at 788, n. 26. … Michigan's
regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas. … We emphasize that the mere fact
that corporations may accumulate large amounts of wealth is not the justification
for ß 54; rather, the unique state-conferred corporate structure that facilitates the
amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures.
Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form
of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political
contributions. We therefore hold that the State has articulated a sufficiently
compelling rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures by
corporations.117
Why did the majority emphasize the artificial entity view? It may have been influenced
by the adoption of that view in CTS. But it is more likely that what really bothered Justice
Marshall was the “corrosive and distorting effect of immense aggregations of wealth” per
se, but he could not take that position because it was rejected as to rich individuals by
Buckley v. Valeo (1976).118 Justice Scalia in dissent points out the weakness of the
majority’s position, stating that while the state charters corporations, “[i]t is rudimentary
that the State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First
Amendment rights,” and that the aggregation of wealth argument is inconsistent with
Buckley.119 Justice Brennan also felt that the majority was on weak ground, and in his
concurrence took the aggregate view that the purpose of the statute is to protect
117
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shareholders.120 Justice Kennedy in his dissent rejects both the aggregate and the artificial
entity views, relying on Bellotti to argue (in accordance with the real entity view) that
corporations are equal to individuals and therefore their speech must be protected.121
We thus arrive at the most recent addition to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the
corporate form, Citizens United. The question presented in that case was whether
Congress could impose the same kind of limits on corporations that Michigan state law
applied in Austin. The Court could have ruled narrowly that the limits were
unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit corporation formed for advocacy purposes by
individuals, but decided instead to use the case for a much broader ruling that all
corporate direct expenditures are permitted under the First Amendment, overruling
Austin.
What is remarkable about Citizens United, although maybe not surprising to the reader at
this point, is that both the majority and the dissent adopt the real view of the corporation,
so that their only disagreement is in divergent assessments of the implications for the
First Amendment. The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy emphasizes, for example,
that the ban on corporate speech is not alleviated by the fact that a PAC organized and
controlled by the same corporation can speak freely because “[a] PAC is a separate
association from a corporation.”122 This assertion can only be made under the real entity
view because under the aggregate view both the corporation and the PAC are owned by
the same ultimate shareholders, and under the artificial entity view both the PAC and the
corporation are created by the same state.
The majority relies on Bellotti for the proposition that “the First Amendment does not
allow political speech restrictions based on a speakers corporate identity.”123 It rejects the
“antidistortion” rationale of Austin as overbroad and inconsistent with Buckley and as
permitting the government to ban speech by media corporations. The aggregate view
advanced by the Solicitor General and by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Austin is
likewise rejected in reliance on the “procedures of corporate democracy” of Bellotti.124
Interestingly, the majority does not even mention the artificial entity view, even though it
(and not the antidistortion rationale per se) was key to the holding in Austin. While the
statute at issue is a federal one and corporations are chartered by states, it could be argued
that the federal government also confers benefits on business corporations by protecting
the market that enables them to engage in business.125
Justice Scalia, in concurrence, does admit that the First Amendment was originally
intended to apply to individuals, “[b]ut the individual person’s right to speak includes the
right to speak in association with other individual persons.”126 But this does not mean that
he adopts the aggregate view, since that view as applied to the shareholders underlay the
principal argument of the Government and was soundly rejected by the majority. Instead,
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what he means is presumably corporate management working together as an association
of persons: “to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of
the modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this
speech to the public debate.”127
Nor does the dissent in Citizens United attempt to advance any view other than the real
entity view. Instead, it emphasizes that corporations are different than natural persons and
therefore may be more heavily regulated:
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and
human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our
society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for
office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their
interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.
The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of
corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process.
Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic
duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects
of corporate spending in local and national races.128
This is all about the corporation itself, not about the shareholders or the state. Similarly:
The same logic applies to this case with additional force because it is the identity
of corporations, rather than individuals, that the Legislature has taken into
account. As we have unanimously observed, legislatures are entitled to decide
"that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly
careful regulation" in an electoral context. Not only has the distinctive potential of
corporations to corrupt the electoral process long been recognized, but within the
area of campaign finance, corporate spending is also "furthest from the core of
political expression, since corporations' First Amendment speech and association
interests are derived largely from those of their members and of the public in
receiving information," … Campaign finance distinctions based on corporate
identity tend to be less worrisome, in other words, because the "speakers" are not
natural persons, much less members of our political community, and the
governmental interests are of the highest order. Furthermore, when corporations,
as a class, are distinguished from noncorporations, as a class, there is a lesser risk
that regulatory distinctions will reflect invidious discrimination or political
favoritism. 129
Not a word here on the corporation’s relationship to the state or to the shareholders. The
artificial entity theory does get discussed later in the dissent, but purely in a historical
context: When explaining the Framers’ view of corporations, Justice Stevens emphasizes
their relationship to the state (“Corporations were created, supervised, and conceptualized
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as quasi-public entities”).130 But he emphasizes that this was a historical artifact that
disappeared with general incorporation statutes, and that “many scholars have long since
rejected the concession theory of the corporation.”131 He does mention briefly the
artificial entity rationale for Austin, but does not emphasize it in comparison with
corporate power.132
The dissent also addresses the aggregate theory at the very end when discussing the
dissenting shareholder rationale of Brennan’s concurrence in Austin, but only as a limited
and secondary argument “beyond the distinctive legal attributes of the corporate form.”133
The main emphasis in this section of the dissent is on the weakness of the “procedures of
corporate democracy” (voting and shareholder derivative suits are “so limited as to be
almost nonexistent” and selling the stock faces many practical difficulties.)134 This is
very far from viewing the corporation as a mere “nexus of contracts” with the primary
contract being that with the shareholders.
The entire Citizens United opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are thus reflective
of the real entity view. Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that
created them and the shareholders than own them. The debate between the majority and
the dissent is about what follows from this perspective on corporations: In the majority’s
opinion, this means that corporations are speakers just like individuals and entitled to the
same First Amendment protection, while the dissent takes the view that because of the
special characteristics of corporations, they have more limited First Amendment rights:
The fact that corporations are different from human beings might seem to need no
elaboration, except that the majority opinion almost completely elides it. Austin
set forth some of the basic differences. Unlike natural persons, corporations have
"limited liability" for their owners and managers, "perpetual life," separation of
ownership and control, "and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy
their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders'
investments." Unlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign
controlled. 70 Unlike other interest groups, business corporations have been
"effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society's economic welfare"; 71
they inescapably structure the life of every citizen. "'[T]he resources in the
treasury of a business corporation,'" furthermore, "'are not an indication of
popular support for the corporation's political ideas.'" "'They reflect instead the
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of
these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even
though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its
ideas.'"
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It might also be added that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the
activities of human beings, to be sure, and their "personhood" often serves as a
useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of "We the People" by
whom and for whom our Constitution was established. …
It is an interesting question "who" is even speaking when a business corporation
places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate.
Presumably it is not the customers or employees, who typically have no say in
such matters. It cannot realistically be said to be the shareholders, who tend to be
far removed from the day-to-day decisions of the firm and whose political
preferences may be opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or directors of
the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking, except their fiduciary
duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds for personal ends.
Some individuals associated with the corporation must make the decision to place
the ad, but the idea that these individuals are thereby fostering their selfexpression or cultivating their critical faculties is fanciful. It is entirely possible
that the corporation's electoral message will conflict with their personal
convictions. Take away the ability to use general treasury funds for some of those
ads, and no one's autonomy, dignity, or political equality has been impinged upon
in the least.135
It is hard to imagine a more forceful statement of the real entity view: the actual human
beings almost disappear completely. In a footnote, Justice Stevens does acknowledge the
existence of other theories of the corporation, but it is clear which theory he favors.136
The artificial entity theory advanced by then Justice Rehnquist in Bellotti and relied upon
by the majority in Austin and the aggregate theory advanced by Justice White in Bellotti
and Justice Brennan in Austin have almost disappeared, and both the majority and the
dissent take the real entity view. Once again, like so many times in the past, the real
entity view reigns supreme.
III.

Conclusion: What’s Next?

As the reader can expect by now, it is hardly likely that this state of affairs will remain
stable forever. When the next transformation in the status of corporations is addressed by
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the Court, it is inevitable that the artificial entity and aggregate theories of the corporation
will re-emerge to once again contend with the real entity view. In fact. Once can see this
process germinating even now within Citizens United.
An important rhetorical move made by Justice Stevens in his dissent and echoed by other
critics of the decision (like President Obama in the State of the Union address) is its
impact on the rules restricting foreigners from participating in US elections. Justice
Stevens states that the majority’s approach “would appear to afford the same protection
to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans.”137
This drew a strong disclaimer from the majority, arguing that even if the Government has
a compelling interest in limiting foreign influence over our political process, the
corporate expenditure ban is overbroad because it “is not limited to corporations or
associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by foreign
shareholders.”138
Predictably, Congress will react by reaffirming the application of the ban on
contributions and expenditures made by foreign nationals to foreign corporations.139 But
how define what is a foreign corporation?
The majority in Citizens United envisages two possibilities. One is to define foreign
corporation as a corporation created by a foreign state. This approach is the one taken by
our tax laws and it follows the artificial entity view.140 The problem, of course, would be
that if this were the only definition, it would be too easy for foreigners to become
Americans merely by incorporating a shell in one of the states.
The other approach mentioned by the majority is to take the aggregate view and look at
the identity of the shareholders, so that a corporation the majority of whose shareholders
are US citizens will count as American and others as foreign. This may work for closely
held corporations, and this approach is taken for example in determining foreignness for
purposes of the rules restricting foreign ownership of media and transportation
corporations. But for publicly traded multinational enterprises the aggregate view is very
difficult to maintain because the shares trade on multiple exchanges, the ownership is
constantly shifting, and most of the owners trade under “street names” than make it very
hard even for the IRS to know their true identity. Thus, I predict that the same reasons
that forced the Court to abandon the aggregate view for diversity jurisdiction will apply
in this context as well.
The third possibility would be to take the real view and confront directly the question of
whether in a globalized world corporations have a meaningful nationality. As discussed
above this issue is extensively debated and reasonable minds can differ.141 It lies at the
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heart of the current transformation of the corporate form from mainly national to
multinational enterprises that do not owe any particular allegiance to any state. Whatever
the ultimate outcome of this debate, it is already possible to predict than once again the
real entity definition of the nationality of corporations, which focuses on where they are
“managed and controlled”, will triumph over a narrow focus on the creating state (too
remote and manipulable) and the shareholders (too remote and diffused).142 To be
continued…
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